The Technological Singularity – Is Winter Coming?

artilect-war

…in perhaps

a) 500 years

b) 150 years 

c) 80 years

d) or 30 years?

 

b) Maybe, c) Oh, that’s soon. d) Can’t be. Or can it?

Inevitably, the rapid development of technology is just another incontrovertible feature of contemporary life – an obvious fact, which does not call for more analysis than the human penchant for breathing. So far, technology and humans have been a hybrid affair. Like the ancient causality dilemma of the chicken and the egg they are inseparable in nature. Which one came first is irrelevant in this – let’s just for now call it – evolutionary equation.

What is relevant is that perhaps for the first time in human history, we could be expecting an unpredictable change in the math. In considering the ‘technological singularity’, information-based technologies are, in fact, on the verge of subtracting the human from the truistic evolutionary process as we know it. Raymond Kurzweil in The Singularity is Near predicts that this final epoch will occur in the year of 2045. In the blink of an eye, human civilisation could be steering towards a totalitarian nightmare. Vernor Vinge in his essay The Coming Technological Singularity calls this state of being ‘the end of the human era’ (He predicts that this could happen before 2030, but even I am a little sceptical about this number). So what if their unfathomable version of the future is not just another banal script for the next science fiction film; but the next Terminator coming alive?

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‘My logic is undeniable’

– I Robot.

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Painting with a broad brush, the singularity describes a tipping point, in which non-biological intelligence will match the range and subtly of human intelligence, creating a rapid redesign cycle. Once we build these machines with greater and faster processing power than our own human brains, we will find ourselves amidst an intelligence explosion. With superhuman intelligence of that magnitude, we could then precariously assume that software will begin to rewrite its own source codes without the help of humans; constantly drawing new conclusions and exponentially improving its capacity to carry out tasks.  And we, who used to hold the for-granted godlike titles of users and creators, smack bang between the born and the made, would simply become leftover variables in the evolutionary equation. After we have been cancelled out, the abstract and disembodied superhuman entities will become the sole vehicle for change. Although Eric Drexler in the Engine of Creation writes that we can embed such transhumance devices in confinement, we’ve seen enough science fiction movies to believe otherwise.

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‘From the human point of view this change will be a throwing away of all the previous rules, perhaps in the blink of an eye, an exponential runaway beyond any hope of control’.

– Greg Bear

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However, as stimulating as these theories may be, the debate over their factualness is in my opinion redundant. Instead, we should use these well-researched and calculated predictions – our perhaps last 50 years with agency – as catalysts, wake up calls, to finally stop fighting wicked wars against each other for the ephemeral comfort of the Iron Throne, and prove that a human’s basic instinct cradles friendly intentions over malicious ones (Yale Study 2013).

And perhaps only then, the ‘White Walkers’ of our space time continuum – our own technological creations – will consider settling for a harmonious co-existence between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In this alternative, perhaps too sanguine, version of the future, we will port our inferior brains into their super-intelligent systems and replace our cancerous limbs with cybernetic ones. And just like that, we will go from mass extinction to life extension; or even human immortality.

 

Fuelling modern feminism with inequality

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Yes, I am a woman, and no, I do not self-identify as a modern feminist. Embracing the words of our Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, ‘I do not find the term particularly useful’.

Modern feminism in the West has significantly been about a dim view of mankind. It has either been about the notion that men are genetically or socially conditioned to be evil or about ‘agitating for women to have 50% of desirable jobs, regardless of any possible innate psychological differences that may lead them to preferring others paths’. I would go as far as to suggest that modern feminism can have backlashing effects, stripping us from the very equality that women in the past have painstakingly fought for. In this post, I pay my respect to feminism before our time, to those foremothers who with sweat and tears have paved the road of equality for us to wander along today. With progressive structures in place, it is now just a matter of profiting from them – I’d much prefer saying, ‘these rights were hard won, go and make the most of them’ than ‘no wonder you can’t fulfil your potential, men whistle at you and there are boobies in the newspaper’. Let’s be honest, enough willpower (and being born on American soil) could even land us in the White House these days.

What we need is a playing field that is blind to gender. Affirmative action, however, does exactly the opposite. It, by definition, ‘targets those that have been discriminated against by the wider population’. While the intensions are unquestionably good (or at least I hope so), it emphasises upon the very fact that women are not ‘as equal as men’. It is patting on our shoulders and whispering ‘we have your back’. Perhaps without these tendentous policies, there is a chance that we will occasionally have to deal with hyper masculinity and misogynistic comments, but more importantly, it could erase the institutional differences between both genders, allowing new manifestations of popular thought to be borne out of mutual respect.. rather than manipulation. It will steer the equality narrative into a more ‘human’ direction, which can transcend archaic gender norms. And then perhaps one day we can procure the absurdity from, let’s say, a misogynistic advertisement, or enjoy the catchiness of a misogynistic song, rather than walk around indignantly all day because we feel provoked that some people objectify females. Of course, if given the opportunity to debate it, we should always address sexist wrongs, but until then, the only difference is that in one scenario we will carry anger, and in the other, we will carry on with our day.

Unfortunately, today’s feminism teaches Western women to perceive themselves as victims and, logically, victims cannot exist without a villain – the man. This explains why relatively harmless acts, such as an admiring glance or a whistle, are imbued with such adverse and weighty significance. If, for example, we simply stopped to constantly make a distinction between females and males, this problem would naturally become obsolete. In this case, if a man looks at me, I infer he’s doing it for the exact same reason I would – because he finds me interesting to look at. Or if I see a man looking at a female supermodel, I suppose nothing more than he is looking at her because a naked woman, let’s be honest, is pretty much universally aesthetically pleasing! Fine, call me naïve if you must, but I prefer living in a world where gender roles are as ancient of an idea as the printing press. There is, by the way, also an all too common misconception that men are exempt from sexist stereotypes, societal pressures and burdening expectations. But in truth they too are victims of widespread gendered norms, where they are told to fit into that hyper masculine and misogynistic mold. This rhetoric masculinizes violence and can inevitably drive dominance, while also stunting emphathy. Modern feminism too often serves as a backbone of this movement (not always, but often enough).

As a humanist, I am, therefore, appealing to our higher sense of cordiality and compassion, for not just the sake of women, but also men, in changing the narrative from ‘feminism’ to ‘humanism’! Let’s endorse a term that understands no distinction between men and women. Part of equality is behaving as equals, and if we continually place all blame on the patriarchy for our problems, we will do ourselves no service, as well as cease in any sort of advancement. Half of this is our battle as individuals — as humans.

(The truth is, many of you will probably disagree with a lot of things I’ve said in this blogpost. Some women may even internalize it. But let’s remember that people accept and reject all types of narratives, all the time. On another note, I once again only speak for countries in the West, such as Australia and the United States, as I am entirely aware that many other countries still need feminism and affirmative actions to achieve the same level of equality that we enjoy today)

Political incorrectness: Poking at the left-wing orthodoxies

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Justice is the very ethos of our living. I have always dreamt of an equal world, where discrimination is a desensitised concept. But with the current upsurge in political correctness in the West, which really just serves as an egalitarian facade, I can’t see this fantasy becoming reality any time soon. Rather, we are battling with an intellectual illness that is only fuelling the hypocrisy of discrimination behind closed doors. I am not suggesting that we should start insulting people, nor am I suggesting it is okay to do so, I am simply proposing an alternative to eulogising political correctness. In saying that, of course, we should not ignore the commendable achievements of this social phenomenon throughout history, especially in diminishing racial inequality, but I have a fear that it is beginning to reach a point that is taking us back to Orwell’s Newspeak in “1984”. In this case, it wouldn’t be such a bad idea to at least try and mitigate its expansion and follow transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson’s ideology of ‘moderation in all things’.

Last I checked, humans are intelligent enough to realise that silence and apathy is a dangerous habit (I did steal this from Martin Luther King). In many, but not all instances, political correctness is the worst form of censorship and I am afraid that by manipulating our freedom of speech in keeping the lid on certain words, phrases, stereotypes or even jokes in hope to not offend anyone, will only weaken us collectively (and slowly kill our sense of humour along with it). Wouldn’t it be much better, if we could ‘fearlessly’ recognise our own worth again, in disregard of what the public proposes should be said or not said to us? We are strong enough to do that, right..?

Applauding and supporting oversensitivity in excess will lead us to become society’s puppets, it will narrow our rational minds and bring an end to stimulating debates. It is an insidious frontal attack on our common sense and conscience. Worst of all, it will serve racists, fascists and misogynists with a silver platter of material to use to hurt others. And we blatantly allowed this to happen by persuading everyone to feel offended and hurt by it.. Ergo, minorities or those who don’t perceive themselves as the average ‘fellow’, will probably then, once again, be the ones finding themselves caught in the middle of this debate. And that just because ‘white’ supremacist policies, which today are disguised as affirmative actions, continue to bolster the rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’. How can that possibly! be a solution to discrimination?

Political correctness can be a dangerous mask for discrimination and a validation for the immorality in this backward world. Our Western civilization is precisely being turned upside-down through covert censorships and strategic redefinitions of our society’s operating principles. But why don’t we take a minute and imagine the opposite, a utopia where everyone living in the West – whatever their beliefs may be, whichever gender they may prefer or wherever they originally come from – is accepting and/or even laughing at political incorrectness… Discrimination could become obsolete. It will run out of fuel to thrive on. It will simply disappear and I literally cannot imagine anything more magical than that.

– The irony of this article is that while I was writing it, I tried to remain as politically correct as possible..

(It’s important to note that I only speak for Western countries, especially the United States and Australia, because I am aware that other countries are still in need of affirmative action, sensitised policies, feminism and political correctness in order to achieve the same level of equality we have) 

The Bernie Tribe

You ‘like’ Bernie Sanders on Facebook.

You ‘like’ The New York Times, because they support Sanders. 

You feel as if Sanders is the right man for the white house.

Your ‘Friends’ on Facebook confirm your notion.

You have just signed up for a membership with the Bernie Tribe.

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US Senator and Democratic Presidential Candidate Bernie Sanders

You are probably a little confused. Don’t worry, so was I. I didn’t remember signing up for anything either. The echoes bouncing off the walls of my Facebook newsfeed did that for me.

My homepage, guilty on all counts of bubble thinking, has been feasting on my previous ‘likes’ and created a political mind of its own and now it has come to rule my thoughts. First Bernie Sanders was simply a fascinating idea, an intriguing character and now I find myself sharing, commenting, posting all about him whenever I can. Although #Birdie Sanders is not the worst candidate that you can support, I stopped considering an alternative presidential candidate a long time ago. I too, was obliviously coerced by all the filtered information to join the Bernie tribe, tribe, tribe… I disappeared into a partisan echo chamber.

A while back, while reading William Saletan’s ‘Bubble Think’ (2010), where he discusses 10 ways to escape a partisan echo chamber, I should have felt a sense of enlightenment, as if I had just found all the answers to my online problems. But I didn’t, I rather felt a sense of pity for those that found themselves dwelling within such closed spaces. At the time, I simply wasn’t aware that Saletan was actually in part addressing his paper to people like me – the average Facebook dweller. The reason I so swiftly ignored his escape routes, specifically to ‘treat insularity as weakness’ was because I didn’t actually think that I was part of any digital tribe. Discounting his words so easily was my mistake. Not informing me better was Saletan’s.

If we were to follow Saletan’s advice of treating insularity as weakness, we must first acknowledge our tribal environment as insular, which stems from the Latin word insula, meaning island. The problem with echo chambers on Facebook is that most of the time we are entirely unaware that we are trapped on an island of limited and coerced information. As some British put it so wisely in 1775, being insular meant being isolated and cut off from intercourse with other nations or people. Facebook, on the other hand, with its revolutionary devices to connect with the whole world with a click of a button, makes us feel quite the opposite. In fact, it makes us feel super-connected. In an instance of a ‘like’, according to Facebook, we can “connect with things we care about… We can like content that our friends post to give them feedback or we can like a page that we want to connect with”. Facebook is connecting us with everyone and everything. It’s that simple.

However, this façade of feeling a false sense of connection to the wider world, is being manipulated by Facebook algorithms, which are incessantly working at personalizing our newsfeed. This phenomenon is driven by the invisible prediction engines, that ‘are constantly creating and refining a theory of who [we] are’ (Pariser 2011). The ‘like’ button is serving as its catalyst. As a result, we find ourselves in a filtered bubble, that will, according to Bozdag & van den Hoven (2015), ‘limit our freedom of choice’. Pariser (2011) once wrote that she had in fact tried to expand her political information horizon by adding people who were conservatives to her friends list, but Facebook’s algorithms had noticed that she ‘liked’ more links from her progressive friends and consequently, did not grant her new friends a space in her Top News Feed. The filter bubble was subtly altering the way she perceived the world.

While we think that our newsfeed reflects a diverse range of information, that happens to tie in with our own set of beliefs, we are, in fact, simply being fooled by our own custom tailored world. According to a study in Huffington Post ‘the algorithm suppresses the diversity of the content you see in your feed by occasionally hiding items that you may disagree with and letting through the ones you are likely to agree with’. If ‘what you click in the past determines what you see next’ (Pariser 2011) then once I had shown interest in Bernie Sanders, Facebook would jump at my service and present me with all the information I want to see and hear about him. In theory, this makes my researching process much easier. In reality, however, it isolates me.

While the algorithms blatantly filter out ‘miscellaneous noises’, leaving us with only a limited pool of available information, we are faced with relentlessly mutually reinforced perspectives. By effectively creating these islands, ‘flamboyant noises’ will instead become louder with each ‘like’, fostering ‘confirmation bias, segregation and polarization’. Surrendering to the wicked workings of the echo chamber, held in place by the non-transparent filter bubble, ideological views can, thus, become entrenched. In The Conversation (2014) I read that the ‘mere discussion of political matters in your chosen sources can shift the position of the entire reader population towards a more radical standpoint’. If this is the case, I had to ask myself, whether I was actually such a radical, anti-Hillary Bernie supporter due to my autonomous judgement or whether I was ‘tricked’ by Facebook in becoming one. After all, in my own partisan news chambers my viewpoints on Bernie Sanders were rarely opposed. The Bernie tribe sticks together, you know.

Although my say in the US presidential race is only marginal, if that, it is only logical that American citizens are experiencing a similar damage to their liberty of thought. ‘Citizens must be aware of different opinions and options in order to make a reasonable decision’ at this year’s election, but with Facebook often considered a primary news source the partisan echo chambers have the capacity to distort the perception of the American user of ‘what’s important, true and real’ (Pariser 2011). Garrett (2009) had found that ‘the more opinion-reinforcing information an individual expects a news story to contain, the more likely he or she is to look at it’. Now imagine constantly being told that your views are superior with only minimal exposure to opposing arguments. Of course, I will grow more sure of my position on the candidacy!

Perhaps it is not too daring to make the assumption that preaching to the choir in these partisan chambers will harm the 2016 presidential election, in which American citizens will choose their leader not by informed and well-rounded research, but rather by feeding on the bigoted junk food their Facebook homepage serves them with. A study in RT News has even shown that the ‘issue of unreliable information going viral online has become so serious that is has been classed as one of the biggest social threats by the World Economic Forum’. Eventually, these feeds will cloud their judgement and Saletan goes as far as to suggest, that it will make them ‘lose touch with reality’. Maybe that is why the Trump Tribe is growing…

Can we, therefore, really stop this phenomenon from fracturing our society by teaching the online community the real dangers of intellectual insularity? William Saletan’s ‘Bubble Think’ may provide a great set of 10 ways to escape the ramifications of tribalism, but fails to account for the average Facebook dweller who has not yet realised his predicament. Enlightenment still awaits most of us.

(It’s a shame that this article will probably only reach the Bernie Tribe. You really just can’t win against this echo chamber)

 

Oh, the humanity!

The word humanity tends to loose its intrinsic value when thrown around in society as if it were a term as straight forward as good and evil. The popular phrase “I have lost all faith in humanity” hasn’t failed to make its rounds in our parochial filter bubbles and has now universally narrowed the profound meaning of ‘what is it to be human’ to the picnic term ‘goodness’.

But it really isn’t that primitive. Humanity is as much the unknown as it is the known. It is as much an invisible and undefinable force to the human race, as it is an unfathomable phenomenon to an Atheist. It stretches far beyond the controversies of morality, to the capabilities of our brains and the vast realms of human consciousness. I, therefore, hypothesise, that humanity cannot be defined within the graspable scope of our language, but can only be felt with our mind.

As common knowledge suggests, a hypothesis needs an experiment to prove its validity and an experiment needs a sample for its execution. If one, then, is curious enough to discover, not who they are, but the essence of ‘mankind’, then the only sample they need is themselves, as part of the human race, in an environment that not yet has been corrupted by the brainwashing forces of society. Only then, as a free spirit, they may begin to consciously feel the mythical forces of humanity as if it were physical matter and only then, “faith in humanity” can be restored again.

 

 

 

A little on Political Philosophy and Racism

A Comparison of Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s Social Contracts

This essay will attempt to argue that Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were very presumptuous in believing that their social contract theories had captured timeless politico-social insights, applicable to all human beings living under the laws of nature. Short of suggesting that their social contracts were simply convenient fictions to legitimize their personal preferences of ‘democratic practice’, this essay will still endeavor to discuss that the political theories of all three constructionists were genuinely compelling narratives at their time of writing. I use the term of democratic practice deliberately, as aspects of the theory of each of these thinkers can be found in the practice of modern democracies today, including the underlying factor of white supremacy. Even though white and non-white segregation was openly accepted during in the 17th and 18th century, its application is not well received under a contemporary context. I will mostly use Thomas Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’, John Locke’s ‘Second Treatise of Civil Government’ and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men’ and ‘Social Contract’ to substantiate this argument.

In what can only be a sketch, this paper will first outline Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s hallowed social contract in the light of the different forms of government to provide a background understanding of the subject matter. It will then move on to critically analyse their differences and similarities. It will do so by examining their social covenant in the context of their time and thus explain their successful reception by the public through the lens of the 17th and 18th century when events connected to the colonization of America were the talk of the day. With Native Americans being in the centre of the many travel narratives crossing the sea, I will use Mills’ Racial Contract as the critical spine of the next part of the essay, which will intertwine the social contract with a contemporary context. Without doubt, Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories are still relevant, as their ideas of the white and non-white divide can still be sensed in a modern milieu, in particular in current democracies that have a history of colonization – Australia being one of them. This paper will end on a lighter note by scrutinizing Rousseau’s contract individually, by taking a closer look at the idea of the ‘Noble Savage’, reflecting a positive attitude towards indigenous people and thus more in sync with the majority of the Australian population today.

 II.Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s Social Contract and Ideal Government

 One must first obtain a thorough understanding of Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s political ideas before an analytical comparison can take place. Each of these thinkers has created a social contract in which a person’s moral obligations are formed upon an indirect communal agreement. Thomas Hobbes, as a staunch monarchist, was the first to elaborate and develop on the social contract and was then quickly followed with contrary opinions by Locke and Rousseau. Even though many may argue that their theories have become irrelevant, we still place great emphasis on their moral and political foundations, and will possibly continue to do so throughout western political history.

When analyzing each thinker critically, one must begin with Hobbes, as his Leviathan may have influenced the subsequent theories by Locke and Rousseau. Each of these theories is best understood if divided into two interlinked parts: the hypothetical state of nature, followed by the product of the social contract. Looking through the lens of Hobbes’ Leviathan man’s life in the state of nature was one of “continual fear and danger of violent death” (Hobbes 1660:259). Life in this state was considered “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1660:260). It is a state of perpetual war. With a subjective foundation based on a mechanistic attribute of human instincts, Hobbes believes that humans are utterly self-interested. This hypothetical stance stands in contrast to Locke’s optimistic state of nature, which he describes as reasonably peaceful. Ultimately, Locke’s state of nature was a “state of liberty” (Locke 1690:333) where the laws of nature guided as an overarching moral guideline. Instead of having an initial state of war as Hobbes argues, Locke’s reason for turmoil is the result of property disputes. Rousseau’s view on the state of nature coincides closely with Locke’s. Rousseau similarly believes that in the state of nature, man lives solitary and leads a simple life. It was the inherited capacity for “pity as a natural sentiment that [contributed] to the mutual preservation of the entire species” (Rousseau 1755:438). Just like Locke’s, Rousseau’s state of nature is an ideal state for humans to reside in. However, as time passed “emerging society gave way to the most horrible state of war” (Rousseau 1755:446). Here, Rousseau’s pessimistic hypothesis when considering human development as an interactive society is principally identical to Hobbes.

All three thinkers acknowledged that at some stage there needed to be savior in the form of a social contract. Hobbes universally claimed that in his state of nature individuals are instinctively drawn to that of which they aspire. By recognizing this capability one will long for an escape from the state of nature and thus, Hobbes’ social covenant was born. The inherent idea of pragmatic self-preservation and protection gives humans a logical reason to “voluntarily surrender all their rights and freedoms” and allow a sovereign with “mightiest authority to protect and preserve their lives and property” (Elahi 2015). This enforcement mechanism is agreed upon, so that a civil society can emerge. Locke believes that “where there is no property; there is no injury” (Locke in Rousseau 1755:444) and therefore a form of contract will give protection from property disputes and allow a civil society to live harmoniously under a cloud of external social pressures. Similarly to Locke, Rousseau argues in his ‘Discourse’ that a normative social contract was necessary to respond to the “difficulties multiplied with men” (Rousseau 1755:441), which emerged from the ills produced by the development of society. Since a return to the ideal state of nature is infeasible, humans have to submit themselves to the General Will through a communal contract agreed upon by all equal human beings.

The social contract has such significance, because it legitimizes a form of government. The social contract offers an appealing justification of political power, because it “reconciles the power of the state with the freedom and equality of each associate” (Neidleman 2012). Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s personal government preference may vary in their implementation, but they were yet able to agree upon one basic feature of governance – people as their central concern. Government for the purpose of this essay is defined as a form of power, undertaken either by a ruling king, a group of political representatives or the civil society as a whole.

Modern democracies of the western type are characterised as Hobbesian democracies, because in “a modern democracy the State is a political Sovereign of the Hobbesian kind, enjoying a constitutional authority that for all practical purposes is absolute, having the potential of reaching every nook and cranny of its subjects’ life and work” (van Dunn 2015). Locke, in comparison to Hobbes’ absolute authoritarian monarch, favoured a representative authority where “the legislative constituted [by the people] can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good” (Locke 1690:365), but is yet obliged to secure their natural rights. The Frenchman Rousseau took this Lockean principle of democracy further. He demanded that all political power should reside with the general will of the people, as it is the people that define a sovereign and not an institution. Rousseau suggests in ‘The Social Contract’, “that as soon as any man says of the affairs of the State, ‘What does it matter to me?’ the State may be given up for lost” (Rousseau 1762:501).

III. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in the 17th and 18th Century

Keeping this basic framework in mind, this component of the essay will aim to link each of these constructionist theories to their historical context. Through this analysis, one will be able to observe their authenticity through the lens of the 17th and 18th century and thus deduce that the events of the time have shaped the legitimacy of Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s political philosophies. This essay will question the foundation the social contract was created upon and conclude that the ‘convenient hypothesises’ they have designed gave logical reason for why a government can only function with a white dominated basis. Thus, a believable fiction, inspired by surrounding events was created, to ultimately legitimize Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s personal political preferences. David Hume, Rousseau’s friend, stresses this by stating that:

“As no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues” (Hume 1748:403).

Even though the social contracts indirectly promoted a democratic form of government dominated by the ‘white population’, it remains imperative to apply the historical lens in which white dominance was a highly favored principle in European society. Therefore, considering the general public opinion of white supremacy, Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s discriminatory opinion of Native Americans, was no threat to the historic ethics of the 17th and 18th Century. During this time, 200,000 colonists along the Eastern Seaboard were settling North America and encounters with Native Americans were an inevitable consequence of the colonial movement (Grinde 1990:4). Travel narratives began to swamp the minds of intellectuals and peasants across Europe and a mixture of speculations began arising. America was the talk of the day. As Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were living and evidently writing during this time, their texts were undisputedly influenced by the stories that travelled the trans-Atlantic sea. With an already existent culture of black slavery in Enlightenment Europe, a new type of non-white ‘sub-humans’ was emerging. An American civilization that was equally behind in human development was thus equally not worthy of the ‘glorified’ social contract. Rule by the ‘industrialized’ and developed ‘whites’ was thus a logical consequence.

However, this only legitimizes Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s governance preference of a white-dominated democratic practice. One must individually look at the events surrounding each of their writings to justify the specific form of government they believed to be the valid basis of a democracy, but this essay does not have the capacity to elaborate on these details. It is, though, important to recognize that each thinker was highly influential during the Enlightenment period, having had direct impacts on the Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution and even the evolvement of the English Crown. They were notable literary figures of their time, where the people “saw with their own eyes, not ours” (Grinde 1990:4) and accordingly the words of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were held in high esteem. Their hypothetical narratives of the social contract and its qualification with regard to Native Americans seemed logical when viewed through the lens of the 17th and 18th century.

IV. Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s contemporary relevance

 The question one might ask is, why Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s social contracts still have contemporary relevance, when parts of their hypotheses are evidently outdated in a world where Native Americans are not savages anymore and racial discrimination is seemingly in decline. I deliberately say part, as many components are “testimonials of intellectual genius and integrity” (Bewaji 2015); but for the purpose of the essay, I will narrow the social contract to its damaging racial aspect. Many liberal democracies have evidently adopted theoretical foundations from the Hobbesian democracy, to Locke’s representative government, followed by Rousseau’s idea of the ‘General Will’. They have embraced a combination of these principles and have thus subsequently carried along with them an underlying dynamic of white supremacy. This social structure may have been widely accepted in the 17th and 18th century, but has become obsolete today. Australian society for example, based on a British code of standard, had willingly adopted ‘white Australia’ policies. Having initially read the contract situation as “historical agreements to erect and maintain white supremacy” (Cudd 2000), Australia as a result still continues to be haunted by its inhumane treatment of Aboriginal Australians in the 19th century. Even Mills’ Racial Contract argues, that the society we currently reside in continues to encompass features of a ‘white supremacist state’.

Evidently, the idea of white supremacy has its roots in the social contract, in which it implies that those that do not belong to the category of ethnic Europeans remain of a lower social ranking. I will begin by looking at how Hobbes’ social contract makes this distinction. In terms of imperial conquest, Hobbes implied that the overarching status of white men did not trouble him. His justification lies in a passage of his Leviathan, in which he states that “where nevertheless they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not to range a great deal of ground; to snatch what they find; but court each little plot with art and labour to give them their sustenance in due season” (Hobbes 1660:322). Here, he advocates that European Nations have the right to appropriate occupied land they may find, indirectly making a stratified distinction between Native Americans and Europeans.

In Hobbes’ Leviathan literature of the social contract, this distinction is mostly evident in his state of nature. Hobbes state of nature is depicted as “the war of every man against every man” (Hobbes 1660:260). Painting an image of obscurity and pessimism, he continues to argue that “there was never such a time or conditions of war as this” (Hobbes 1660:260). More interestingly, he later mentions that, ”there are many places as they live so now” (Hobbes 1660:260). Mills suggests that this contradiction could only be consistent if Hobbes’ “literal state of nature is purely reserved for whites” (Mills 1997:64). Therefore as “the most notorious state of nature in the contractarian literature is really a nonwhite figure” (Mills in Valls 2005:47), Hobbes suggests that without a social contract even Europeans could descend to the ‘brutish’ state in which Native Americans were residing. His escape from such a consequence was an absolute sovereign ruled by a man of the state, so the controlled exercise of power can ultimately protect the people from themselves.

Locke similarly describes Native Americans as not worthy of his contract. This is best visible in the description of his state of nature, which is normatively regulated by non-prudential natural law under which money and property already exists. He famously argues in his ‘Second Treaties’ that God has given the world to the “industrious and rational”, while in America one found “wild woods and uncultivated waste” (Locke 1690:340) left for the idle ‘Indians’. This mental division of supremacy and subordination indicated that those Europeans who have long left the state of nature could lawfully overwrite the property law, if it was to seize the land on which Native American ‘savages’ reside. Even though the purpose of Locke’s reluctant democracy was to secure natural rights, such as that of property and liberty, the description of Native Americans in his social contract justified the merciless stripping of inalienable human rights. This premise later gave legitimacy to the expropriation contract, which suggests “the principle philosophical delineation of the normative arguments supporting white civilizations conquest of America” (Williams in Mills 1997:67) and in the following years also extended its adoption to the Pacific.

A recount as such, sparks the memories of Australian history, which accurately mirrored this western cultural psyche. Almost identical to the situation in America, “Captain James Cook had taken possession of eastern Australia as ‘terra nullius’, land not effectively belonging to anyone” (Barta 1987:240). Colonel George Arthur, who was in charge of the settlement in 1826, even confessed that there will not be a “restoration of the land to savages who had never known how to make it productive” (Barta 1987:240). Once again, widely accepted socio-political values demanded that Indigenous people were not worthy of the social contract, despite the fact that their dreamtime stories could be considered the equivalent of a social contract, that had been in place for 50,000 years. It was nothing short of white condescension to call Indigenous people ‘savages’. An underlying sense of white and non-white segregation is unfortunately still embedded in our society today, suggesting that the recovery from such brutal behaviour still continues to prolong without much success.

Rousseau on the other hand, could be seen as the most racially innocent out of all three thinkers. After all, Rousseau reasoned that “nature in giving men tears, bears witness that she gave the human race the softest hearts” (Rousseau 1755:437). His writings have been associated with the external term of a ‘noble savage’. This can be seen, firstly, through Rousseau’s ‘Social Contract’, where he makes no distinction between whites and non-whites, as “no man has a natural authority over his fellow man” (Rousseau 1755:468). Secondly, Rousseau was assumed to have taken an object lesson from this ancient civilisation as they visibly mirrored his ideal form of government where people are the constituents of a nation and institutions are not. According to him, “natural freedom is the only object of the polity of the savages; with this freedom do nature and climate rule alone amongst them . . . they maintain their freedom and find abundant nourishment” (Rousseau in Grinde 2015:4). This optimistic view of the environmental determinism, shaping the lives of Native Americans, in fact, inspired the democratic ideal of freedom of many of his contemporaries.

However, Rousseau’s paternalistic praise of Native Americans remains limited. An appreciation for healthy animals as Mills suggests, does in no way promote equality, let alone place them in the same social standing as Europeans. Thus, even if Rousseau’s noble savages are “physically and psychologically healthier than the Europeans of the degraded and corrupt society, they still remain ‘savages’” (Mills 1997:69). Therefore, even in Rousseau’s rather encouraging account of his social contract “an underlying racial dichotomization and hierarchy of civilized and savage remains clear” (Mills 1997:69). Therefore, one can daringly assume that the social contract theories of each thinker, some guiltier than others, promoted a domination of white civilisation, in which we still reside to this day.

V. Conclusion

In what was only a sketch, this essay concludes with the assertion that Hobbes’, Locke’s and Rousseau’s social contracts were convincing explanations for ideal forms of governance in the 17th and 18th Century. Through the lens of this historical period, racial discrimination towards Native Americans in each of their theories was considered acceptable and was even employed as a justification for white supremacy. However, these ideas are less admirable on today’s political stage as in reality many modern democracies are still recovering from the discrimination that had once been embedded in the foundations of civil society. Rousseau offers the least discriminatory approach towards Native Americans, thus possibly making him the most valuable contributor to contemporary ethical politics. With white domination still present in many societies, modern democracies should not respond to this issue by simply “adding non-whites into the mix of our political institutions, representation and so on” (Friend 2004), but should instead revisit the social contract theories by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau and acknowledge the origins of this systemic exclusion. On that basis, a new social contract may come into existence, in which the equality of white and non-white human beings is not just an egalitarian façade. In spite of this poignant flaw, each social contract has laid imperative foundations upon which responsible government and contemporary constitutionalism were founded (Olynyk 2012).

*The direct quotes from Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are all from the book ‘The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought’. However, the year the Harvard Referencing indicates refers to the year their original texts were written, rather than the publishing year of Broadview (2008).

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